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21 JUN 1954

TO: C/SE/3 - SR/COF - SE/PP - C/SR

FROM: SR/3 #2

SUBJECT: An Evaluation of the AERODYNAMIC Project.

1. Due to recent reverses experienced by the AERODYNAMIC Project in the PI field regarding operations in the Ukraine, it appears appropriate that an evaluation of the Project as a whole, to include all aspects of CIA collaborations with the ZPUHVR, be made. Although a renewal of the PP portion of the Project for FY 1955 seems certain with some reservation as to the PI portion, it is expected that the following evaluation might have some bearing on decisions regarding the future of AERODYNAMIC, or, to be more precise, the future of exploiting the ZPUHVR or any other Ukrainian groups in anti-Soviet activity and all that this implies.

2. The evaluation herewith submitted is based on the Undersigned's own experience with the Project, including both "desk" work and close association with the ZPUHVR personnel involved. The evaluation is also based on facts compiled and contained in the Project files. Documentation of any statement or reference to fact made in the evaluation shall be presented upon request.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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SUBJECT: An Evaluation of the AERODYNAMIC Project.

1. In 1948 a survey was conducted by CIA representatives on the various Ukrainian Emigre organizations for the purpose of selecting from among these groups the most bona fide, best organized, most representative and legitimate, etc. group to be used in exploiting the Ukrainian Resistance Movement in the Ukraine in anti-Communist, anti-Soviet activity. As a result of this survey the ZPUVR, the Foreign Representation of the UNVR in the Ukraine, was selected and an agreement was entered into between this group and CIA whereby a joint effort would be made to develop clandestine communications with the Resistance Forces in the Ukraine, the ZPUVR supplying agent personnel, contact data, etc., CIA furnishing the technical support, i.e., training, supplies, air dispatch, communications equipment, etc. The action thus initiated is today known as the AERODYNAMIC Project and is a joint FI and PP endeavor.

2. Following this initial working agreement with the ZPUVR, the project was further developed by both OSO and OPC with these CIA anti-Soviet objectives:

- a) To provide financial assistance to the ZP in its role as the only real representative of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement outside the Ukraine, which included, among other things, support of a ZPUVR publication.
- b) To provide support (supplies) through air drop to enable the Ukrainian Resistance to expand its organization and potential.
- c) To provide supplies and communications equipment for aerial to be used in the event overt, mass action was required.
- d) To establish a "black" radio transmitter outside the USSR for broadcasts to the population of the Ukraine.
- e) To coordinate war plans for sabotage, escape and evasion and guerrilla warfare.
- f) To establish a sound working liaison with the intelligence service (SB) of the OUN and to obtain from it positive intelligence and counter-espionage information.
- g) To maintain adequate communications between the Resistance Movement in the Ukraine and bases outside the Iron Curtain, including air drop, overland courier, U/T, S/W or other means.
- h) To train and infiltrate agents for intelligence gathering purposes.

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i) To establish operational support facilities in the Ukraine, utilizing personnel of the Resistance Movement in order to obtain documentation, safehouses, transit facilities for agent operations directed at areas of the USSR beyond the borders of the Ukraine.

j) To pick up and bring out from the Ukraine archives of the Resistance Movement and certain key personnel.

k) The project was later expanded to include a Soviet Study Group to be located in the United States, operated by the ZPUHVR and staffed by prominent Ukrainian scholars in exile).

3. The ZPUHVR, on the basis of a mandate from the UHVR, was charged with and attempted to do the following in its work in the emigration:

- a) Provide diplomatic and political representation abroad.
- b) Consolidate the Ukrainian emigration on the political level in behalf of the Resistance Movement.
- c) Publicize the Resistance Movement and its activities in the Ukraine.
- d) Coordinate all assistance to the Resistance Movement.

4. In para 1 above are shown the CIA objectives in its collaboration with the ZPUHVR. A summary of results produced to date regarding each objective is as follows:

a) CIA has supported the ZP financially, in the form of newspaper subsidy or salaries to key personnel, from 1948 to the present time. The financial assistance enabled the key personnel of the ZP to carry out the provisions of the mandate listed in para 3 above, and to engage in anti-Soviet activities practically full-time as well as to work toward an independent Ukraine.

b) A limited amount of supplies was dropped to the Resistance Forces but not in a quantity sufficient enough to expand their forces to any great extent or to increase their potential.

Operational

c) No supplies or communications equipment were dropped for use in overt, mass action by the Resistance Forces in the Ukraine.

d) A "black" radio set-up has been approved in project form in 1953, equipment has been procured, a special staff has been assembled for script writing and broadcasting, scripts have been written but a safe-house installation in which a studio is to be built has not yet been obtained and therefore no broadcasts have been made to-date.

e) A PM cadre was planned and organized (Landsberg Project) but failed

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to survive. No other war plans were carried out.

f) Some intelligence has been obtained from SB sources in the Ukraine as contained in a pouch brought out by a courier in 1950.

g) Communications with the Resistance Movement have been made as follows:

i. Airdrop of agent personnel in 1949 but no success in reaching Resistance Headquarters in the Ukraine or in communicating with the West.

ii. Airdrop of agent personnel in 1950; contact with Resistance Headquarters made.

iii. One successful overland courier mission from the Ukraine to the West completed in 1950 which ^{provided} produced material from the Resistance Movement in the Ukraine containing intelligence of value to CIA and to the ZPUHVR mission.

iv. Airdrop of agent personnel in 1951; successful contact with Resistance Headquarters made, W/T messages transmitted until the fall of 1953 from this group.

v. Airdrop of agent personnel in 1952; successful contact with Resistance Headquarters made, W/T messages from one member of this group transmitted until the fall of 1953 and S/W messages until spring of 1954.

h) See under (g) above.

i) Some support facilities were arranged by one AERODYNAMIC agent, which facilities were still active as of May, 1954.

j) Archives of the Resistance Movement were brought out in 1950. No key personnel have been exfiltrated.

k) The Soviet Study Group, composed of Ukrainian scholars, researchers, and experts on the Ukraine, has been assembled by the ZP leadership in the United States and has produced some valuable material on the Soviet Ukraine as well as scripts for the "black" radio broadcasts.

5. A summary of the action taken or results obtained by the ZPUHVR in line with the objectives of its mandate are:

a) It has succeeded in establishing contact with a branch of the United States Government (CIA), in obtaining support from this branch, and has presented its views to other branches of the United States Government as well as governments of other Western Countries.

b) Although it was instrumental in the reorganization of the ZChOUN and effecting a minor consolidation in the Ukrainian emigration in this respect, it has failed to consolidate a majority of the emigration in behalf of the Resistance Movement.

c) It has succeeded, basically through CIA subsidy of its newspaper, in

publicizing the activities of the Resistance Movement.

d) It has succeeded in coordinating assistance to the Resistance Movement in that it did procure CIA support, but it has failed in convincing the ZHOUN Bandera Faction that the ZPUHVR is responsible for procuring assistance for the Resistance Movement.

6. It was stated in para 1 that the ZPUHVR was selected from among a number of Ukrainian émigré organizations to enter into a joint effort with CIA in establishing clandestine communications with the Resistance Forces in the Ukraine. It is a fact that when this working arrangement was created the primary objective of CIA was to establish contact with the Resistance Movement in the Ukraine but specifically for the purpose of exploiting its anti-Soviet potential for both hot and cold war purposes and of serving long-range United States interests. The gathering of positive and specific intelligence was to be developed for a limited use in the then present situation and for a full scale effort in the event of war. It may be that our "real" intentions in the project developed subsequently to a point where the gathering of positive intelligence was assumed by some to be the primary objective rather than supporting the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, but basically, and as far as the ZPUHVR representatives were concerned, it remained the same as originated--that of maintaining contact with the Ukrainian Resistance Movement and supporting it both inside and outside the Soviet Union in its anti-Soviet activities both in cold and in hot war. It is certain that those ZPUHVR representatives in contact with CIA ~~representatives~~, although aware of our desire for positive intelligence, were either led to believe or were specifically told that our primary interest in collaborating with them was to support their organization abroad and in the Ukraine in resistance activity. It is also certain that CIA did not hire the entire ZPUHVR as an agent apparatus, for as a recognized and authorized representative body of an underground government, it assumed CIA support to be support of its resistance activity although intelligence gathering by some of its members was implied.

7. In evaluating whether the support of the ZPUHVR and the Ukrainian Resistance Movement was worth the time, effort and cost or whether the desired results were obtained, the basic objective of the project must be kept in mind. If in fact the objective was the support of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement through the collaboration with the ZPUHVR, then the answer is in the positive for the record speaks for itself. The existence of a Ukrainian underground movement was proved in that contact with its headquarters was established and maintained until the fall of 1953. Although it was never determined how extensive the Ukrainian Resistance Movement was at any given time during the years 1948-1953, indications were that it did cover quite an extensive area in the Western Ukraine, that it had a large following from legalized sympathizers (or how else could it have survived), that it was well organized and active (as seen from the recent statements made by the Soviet Government regarding the Ukrainian Nationalists and action taken to combat them.)

8. Success in this support of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement should also be measured by the progress made by the ZPUHVR, also to be considered a part of the resistance. Through our support it was able to remain a cohesive organization capable of letting its actions directed at the Soviet Union be felt. For example, through the medium of its publications, its

various other anti-Soviet activities, etc. it must have given the Soviets the impression and much concern too that it was being supported financially quite extensively by the United States, and morally by countless others, thus presenting to the Soviet Union a real threat to its status quo. In this same respect who is to say how extensive the Soviets believe the CIA-ZPUHVR-UHVR operations in the Ukraine to be.

9. Since support of the ZP and the Ukrainian Resistance was also based on their use during a hot war, which of course did not happen during the period of this support, their use could have been relied upon anytime during this time had the need for it been present. This, too could be called success even though in a negative sense.

10. To elaborate a bit further on the value of supporting the ZPUHVR and the Ukrainian Resistance to this time, their potential as an ally in conforming with American Policy regarding the Soviet Union and the struggle against communism should not be overlooked. As has already been mentioned, their availability to our side during a hot war against the Soviet Union could have been depended upon. However, the money spent in insuring their support in a hot war, if compared with the sums similarly used regarding other countries engaged in a struggle against the spread of communism, was infinitesimal. Since this hot war support was not utilized because there was no hot war in their area does not mean that money was expended foolishly. Afterall, one cannot take out insurance after an accident has happened--it must be anticipated.

11. If our support of the ZPUHVR and the Ukrainian Resistance Movement is measured or evaluated in terms of intelligence "take" derived from this arrangement, or evaluated from a strict FI point of view separating from it the objective of aiding the Ukrainian Resistance Movement as such, or evaluated from the positive intelligence procured, then it must be said that it is questionable whether the effort paid off since it then becomes a matter of interpretation; for the matter rests on the degree of importance attached to any information procured by the project operations, and any information obtained clandestinely is of value, be it positive intelligence or not. If the project failed to obtain sufficient intelligence on radar installations, airfields, troop movement, atomic energy installations and the like, those desiring such information could rightly say that the effort did not pay off. In fact, this type information was produced in limited quantities only. However, other types of information procured, i.e., situation reports, information regarding underground activities, etc. did satisfy the requirements of those interested in these fields and in this case this intelligence was of extreme value and those interested in this type of information would consider the effort to have paid off. And in a negative sense, the potential in the form of agent personnel present to report unusual war preparations should not be discounted as having no value --again insurance before the accident.

12. To digress a bit, success in an FI type operation mounted by CIA-ZPUHVR and confronted by the many obstacles, difficulties, etc. in the area of operations cannot be measured in terms of an indefinite period of time during which a constant flow of intelligence is to be forthcoming in order to consider the effort productive, worth-while, successful, etc. Instead,

success should be measured in terms of specific periods of time or in terms of completion of any specific assignment. To hope that an agent or group of agents, as dispatched into the Ukraine by the joint effort of CIA and ZPUVR, can survive indefinitely, come up with choice bits of intelligence considered by some as "the real thing" ad infinitum is wishing thinking. In the case of this project and with the exception of the 1949 team dispatched into the Ukraine, successful completion of missions specific assignments carried out were many. Without evaluating the intelligence procured during the course of these operations into the Ukraine, the objective of determining the existence of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement in the Ukraine was reached, contact with this movement's headquarters had been maintained. And had there been a hot war during the period when AERODYNAMIC agents were in contact with the Resistance Headquarters and in communication with CIA their value as well as the value of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement can well be imagined.

13. Since reverses in operations mounted into the Soviet Union appear to be inevitable, with this project experiencing its share, since the situation in the Ukraine regarding the status of the Resistance Movement has developed into an unknown quantity, now, in June 1954, it is necessary to consider the future of the project involving the use of the ZPUVR and other components of the Ukrainian Resistance movement, at least in FI operations, to determine whether efforts as made in the past to attain the same objectives should be continued. A summary of the existing situation is as follows:

a) Agent personnel dispatched into the Ukraine by the project have not been in contact with the Resistance Headquarters since late summer of 1953.

b) Although it is certain that members of the Ukrainian Resistance still exist throughout parts of the Ukraine, it is not definitely known whether an organized Headquarters still exists, including the top leadership. Also not known is the extent of the Ukrainian Resistance, its capabilities, the type activity it is engaged in, etc.

c) The principle ZPUVR representative dispatched to the Ukraine is reported to have been captured and shot by the Soviets. It was through him that contact with the Resistance Headquarters was maintained.

d) The W/T operator attached to the above mentioned ZPUVR representative and indirectly to Headquarters has not been heard from since the fall of 1953 and it can be assumed that he suffered the same fate as did the ZP representative.

e) The only other w/t operator in the area lost his w/t set, is cut off from Headquarter's contact due to losses there, and is only able to communicate with us via S/W. He has been instructed to exfiltrate.

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f) There are no agent recruits in training who might be used to renew the lost link with the Ukrainian Resistance Movement in the Ukraine.

g) Recruitment of agent personnel outside the Soviet Union who could meet the requirements for a mission into the Ukraine under a plan calling for legalization, or for contacting Homeland Headquarters black for that matter, is practically impossible.

h) It appears to be almost certain that other operations in the Ukraine, run by SALOPIA and allegedly in contact with Resistance Forces, are penetrated by the Soviets and consequently their future, as far as the purpose for which they were intended is concerned, appears doubtful.

i) Through a concentrated effort the enemy appears to have dealt a serious blow to both operations and the Ukrainian Resistance Headquarters, to say nothing of the rank and file scattered remnants of the Ukrainian Underground who to now continued operating "black."

j) Even if some semblance of a Ukrainian Resistance Headquarters might still exist, it is possible that it and many of its branches are penetrated by the Soviets.

14. In light of the above facts of the situation the question or questions to be decided are:

a) Should our efforts be continued to make and maintain contact with the Ukrainian Resistance Headquarters and/or forces with the collaboration of ZPUHVR? If so, should an attempt be made to recruit agent personnel from the emigration or should an attempt in contacting the Ukrainian Resistance Headquarters be contingent on exfiltrates, some of whom might be legals, who could be trained and sent back in?

b) If it is decided that it is no longer worth while to attempt to maintain contact with the Ukrainian Resistance which usually precludes some "black" type operations, should the AERODYNAMIC Project/FI remain open to possibilities of running operations into the Ukraine without the participation of the ZPUHVR, using recent defectors who would only be used as legals, would have the dual assignment of procuring intelligence and reporting on resistance activities and who would not confine their activities only to the western Ukraine but would operate in the East as well?

15. Assuming, as it has already been pointed out, that up to now the Project has paid off in that through the presence of our agent personnel in the Ukraine we had an intelligence gathering potential, a link with the Ukrainian Resistance in the event of a hot war, the possibility of obtaining timely notice of unusual war preparations by the Soviets and a medium of engaging the enemy in endless and widespread activity in trying to locate agents in any number of places where they did not exist, there seems to be no reason why this effort should not be continued for achieving these general objectives. It is admitted that reverses have occurred and that there are not now present any agent personnel who could be dispatched to continue where others left off. In view of this, there will be those who might argue that under the present situation the anticipated results are not worth the effort. In answer to this argument, only if we admit total defeat, or decide that we no longer require or desire to exploit the dissaffected

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Ukrainians in a cold or hot war, or do not desire or require intelligence of all types from the Ukraine, would that argument be valid. It is believed it is not. As for the lack of agent personnel, one must remember that if it were possible to draft agent recruits for mission assignments as one would draft recruits for a standing army then this problem would not exist. However, since this is not the case, suitable agent recruits can only be gotten at certain opportune moments. Thus, to hope to operate on some sort of schedule whereby a given number of recruits can be depended upon for a given period of time seems, with the dwindling possibilities for drawing from the emigre circles, to be coming a thing of the past. It might, therefore, become necessary to wait for exfiltrates for use in future AERODYNAMIC operations involving the collaboration of the ZPUHVR. This being the case, relationship with the ZPUHVR as in the past should be maintained for this eventuality and exploited as in the past for similar and added objectives. If agent personnel can be recruited in the emigration then they should be recruited and used accordingly. If this cannot be done, then if and when exfiltrates do arrive and found suitable for our use, they should be trained and dispatched this year, next year or the next.

16. In taking the affirmative stand to the questions in para 14 (a) a continued cooperation with the ZPUHVR is (precluded) for the same reasons they were originally selected to collaborate with CIA in the Project, plus these added factors:

a) The ZPUHVR is the only group officially authorized by the Homeland Headquarters to conduct support of its Resistance Movement involving agent dispatch, communications, etc.

b) In past association with CIA in operations the ZPUHVR members engaged in these operations have gained much experience in such matters and should therefore be utilized accordingly, or they should be retained in any event because of the knowledge they have gained through these operations.

c) The security of those members of the ZPUHVR engaged in operations has been excellent and they have committed no security breaches as far as is known.

d) The ZPUHVR would be indispensable as leaders of guerrilla warfare in the event of a hot war as long as their current status with the Resistance Movement exists.

e) Any exfiltrate, courier or other personnel from the Ukrainian Underground would undoubtedly report to the ZPUHVR (with the possible exception of those under Bandera influence) for future disposition.

1) Finally, the ZPUHVR, and specifically those engaged in the past in operations with CIA still are the top experts from among the Ukrainians in the emigration on clandestine operations, underground tactics, enemy make-up, activity and the like.

17. In answer to whether the AERODYNAMIC Project/FI should remain open to possibilities of running operations into the Ukraine without the participation of the ZPUHVR, or both simultaneously for that matter, using recent defectors etc. as outlined in paragraph 14 (b), the answer can only be in the positive as long as we are engaged in the intelligence gathering field and desire intelligence from the Ukraine for the furthering of American interest. For this purpose

Agency personnel should be available to exploit a favorable situation, i.e., the arrival or procurement of a suitable Ukrainian defector (of course unaffiliated with any Ukrainian nationalist organization in the emigration), and a flexible FI plan should be drawn up which, although containing planning in general, would not bind one to a given schedule prior to the occurrence of certain pertinent events, the arrival of the defector in this case. (For example, even though we have a defector program, not all defections were scheduled to take place at any specific time and certainly many occurred without warning. The plans for these defectors' use, if any, must have been drawn up after their defection, depending on their own capabilities, qualifications, etc.)

18. Since at times in this report it has been difficult to separate the FI and the PP activities because of the nature of the project and the dual functions of the ZPUHVR, much of the evaluation of the PP portion has already been made. In many cases reference was made to the ZPUHVR to include its overall function in its collaboration with CIA without designating any specific type of activity. To add to this, however, an evaluation of the PP is in order with some comments as to its accomplishments, value and future use.

19. In paragraph 2 are listed the various objectives or tasks which the Project set out to accomplish with the aid of the ZPUHVR, many of which were of a PP nature, as for example the establishment of a "black" radio broadcast facility, the support of a newspaper, the creation of a Military Cadre and Political Action Group, the creation of a Soviet Study Group and the general support of the ZPUHVR in its anti-Soviet struggle both inside and outside the Soviet Union. In paragraph 4 a summary of results attained in these efforts was made, and in paragraph 5 a summary of achievements the ZPUHVR made independently on the basis of its mandate is listed. To elaborate further, however, on the progress made to date in a PP category the following account is given:

a) Through CIA support the ZPUHVR has been able to remain solidly organized in the emigration which facilitated its carrying out anti-Soviet action of deep concern to the Soviet regime. Proof of this lies in the known interest shown the ZPUHVR by the Soviets and attempts made by the Soviets to learn as much as possible about the ZPUHVR with the aim to crush it. Recent internal developments show that ZPUHVR influence and activity, along with other Ukrainian group activity, have been effective, have helped create many problems for the Soviets and have given the Soviet regime cause to be concerned about the increase of nationalist sentiment in the Ukraine.

b) The CIA sponsored ZPUHVR newspaper has been an effective instrument in presenting anti-Communist views and in uniting, although not always politically, the Ukrainians in emigration in their anti-Communist, anti-Soviet attitudes. With the exception of being openly opposed to one American policy action (American Committee), the newspaper has followed American policy completely in the anti-Soviet line.

c) The "black" radio set-up has been approved, organized and is ready for action and should, with the anticipated procurement of safehouse facilities, begin operating. Depending on the reception of the broadcasts, this phase of activity should prove effective and worth-while in the

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general scheme of American Psychological Warfare directed at the Soviet citizen. A competent staff of script writers has been assembled and scripts are being written for future use.

d) The Soviet Study Group, consisting of prominent Ukrainian experts, has been organized and has produced several pertinent studies on the Soviet Union and the Ukraine. Two of these studies have been presented to SR/PP for evaluation and if necessary will be disseminated to other Government Agencies. Other work performed by members of this group is a compilation of names of personalities in the Ukraine as listed in various Ukrainian newspapers. These have been made available to CIA and will continue to be submitted as long as the Study Group exists.

e) Through ZPUHVR efforts the ZChOUN has been reorganized and now presents, jointly with the ZPUHVR, a more solid anti-Soviet bloc than heretofore. This reorganization of the most representative Ukrainian political party in exile and its rapprochement with the ZPUHVR has made available to the United States in the event of a hot war a well organized governing body which could prove vital in directing guerrilla warfare in the Ukraine and in governing activities.

20. In answering the question whether or not it has been of value to have supported the ZPUHVR in PP activities during this period of cold war with the Soviet Union, coupled with the increasing threat of Communism in general, one must bear in mind that it is difficult to measure or to pin-point the effects such intangible activities engaged in might have had. At best these effects can only be thought of in a negative sense, in knowing or assuming that certain undesired things did not happen because of these activities, or looked upon in retrospect, at some future date, for the results they brought about. Assuming, however, that the ZPUHVR did help the United States achieve certain goals in the cold war with the Soviet Union, to say nothing of furthering its own cause, its value appears self evident. Whether or not the results we assume we achieved in the cold war could have been attained without the participation of the ZPUHVR would be impossible to decide now. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the ZPUHVR contribution in PP activities was of extreme value and for the following reasons:

a) The ZPUHVR served as an effective instrument in disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda.

b) The ZPUHVR helped in maintaining the proper anti-Soviet attitude in the minds of a great number of exiled Ukrainians.

c) The ZPUHVR voiced opinions regarding the Soviet Union many of which if voiced officially by the United States might have had serious repercussions.

d) The ZPUHVR supported wholeheartedly the United States line in overall anti-Communist activity.

e) The ZPUHVR helped in creating and maintaining internal problems for the Soviet Union regarding the Ukrainians and their aspirations.

21. As to whether CIA should continue supporting the ZPUVR in PP activities to carry on the work done in the past and to implement further various phases of plans now under way, the answer is yes, and for the same reasons already listed. There might be those who believe the activities now being supported by or planned for in the AERODYNAMIC Project/PP regarding ZPUVR could best be handled by some other branch of CIA now engaged in uniting various emigre groups in anti-Communist, anti-Soviet activity. This indeed would be an ideal way of utilizing the ZPUVR in the PP field providing a platform by this other agency unit could be worked out which would be acceptable to the ZPUVR. But it must be remembered that the ZPUVR, while desiring our support, cannot be coerced into cooperating in a venture, although basically sound, but with which it does not agree wholeheartedly. Perhaps when certain changes in this other agency unit's platform are made agreeable to the ZPUVR and to other Ukrainian groups, then the role now being played by the AERODYNAMIC Project/PP regarding ZPUVR should or could be transferred accordingly. In the meantime, however, and until such other arrangements can be made, CIA through the AERODYNAMIC Project/PP should continue exploiting ZPUVR as it has in the past.